Manchester City’s rule-breaking may go beyond football. The independent Commission found that the club inflated its income, concealed expenses and paid a key individual through a sham consultancy. Leaked documents identify him as City’s manager, Roberto Mancini, with payments routed to his company, Sparkleglow Holdings Ltd. We believe the evidence points to £12m in unpaid UK tax. The consequences could include a much larger tax bill and a criminal investigation.

    This report is subject to four important caveats.

    First, our analysis assumes that the Commission’s findings of fact are correct. City maintains its innocence and says it will appeal, alleging material errors of law, principle and fact (but not identifying any of them).

    Second, we have only the heavily redacted, 40-page core decision. The detailed appendices remain unpublished. They are likely substantial: the parties’ document index alone ran to 750 pages.

    Third, we rely on documents obtained by Der Spiegel as part of the Football Leaks investigation, and on the original 2018 reporting by Der Spiegel and L’Espresso, also covered by The Guardian. We have reviewed the underlying materials ourselves and assume the documents are authentic; to our knowledge, this has never been questioned.

    Four, we make no claims that any named individuals committed tax evasion or other criminal offences; the facts suggest that they may have done, but this will depend on their state of mind at the time.

    This report is therefore a preliminary assessment based on the evidence currently available. We conclude:

    Roberto Mancini received large payments under a consultancy contract with Al Jazira Sports and Cultural Club.

    On the basis of the Commission’s findings and leaked documents, the contract was a sham, and in reality represented remuneration for Mr Mancini’s employment with Manchester City.

    Manchester City should therefore have applied UK PAYE income tax and National Insurance in the usual way – but the evidence suggests the club unlawfully failed to do so. We expect around £12m of tax went unpaid.

    We don’t know whether HMRC has commenced an investigation into these arrangements and, if it has, whether it has been resolved – but there’s no sign of any settlement payments in Manchester City’s accounts.

    The highly irregular nature of the arrangement, and the Commission’s findings of sham and intentional concealment, suggest to us that there should be a criminal investigation into whether tax evasion offences were committed.

    The Commission’s finding that Manchester City knowingly filed false accounts suggest that Companies Act criminal offences may have been committed.

    The decision

    The independent Commission’s published decision describes two separate ways in which Manchester City manipulated its finances. The point was to circumvent, and indeed break, the rules limiting how much clubs can spend relative to their income.

    First, Manchester City inflated its income. The club recorded funding from its owner, Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), as sponsorship revenue, which boosted City’s reported income by more than £830m across the 2009/10 to 2017/18 seasons.

    Second, it hid its expenses. The club’s accounts omitted costs which were really City’s, but which ADUG paid. These omitted payments understated expenses by £8.866m, £7.4m and £500,000 for three individuals. There was a complex related arrangement involving players’ image rights and an entity called Fordham.

    As the decision puts it:

    109) Before we turn to each individual Charge, we make one further overarching observation.
While the facts that underlie each of Charges 1(A), 1(B) and 1(C) are discrete, all have in
common the feature that they involved conduct (and as we have found, intentional conduct)
which would
a) Disguise the true nature of certain revenues and liabilities/expenses, to give the

appearance of minimising the Club’s financial dependence on ADUG and

b) Give a misleading impression in the Club’s financial statements that the Club’s

financial position was better than it in fact was.

    This report focuses mainly on the payments to the first of those individuals. The other hidden payments may raise similar issues, but we have less information about them. We also talk about the general criminal law implications of filing false accounts.

    The wider inflation of income probably doesn’t have adverse tax consequences for City, although not enough information is available at the moment to say that with any confidence. Conversely, whilst it’s sometimes suggested the deception means that City overpaid corporation tax or VAT, our preliminary view (on the limited information available) is that this is probably not the case. Certainly they can’t have overpaid corporation tax, because their losses meant they paid no corporation tax over this period:

    The arrangement with Roberto Mancini

    The decision describes an arrangement under which remuneration for services contracted to be provided to City by an individual was instead recorded in a consultancy agreement between the individual and another party, funded by £8.866m from ADUG. The description is heavily redacted:

    92) The first in time of those devices was the J. That is addressed in detail
in Appendix 16. In essence a significant part of the remuneration that we find was payable
by the Club to J in return for the services that Jj was contracted to provide to the
Club
a) Was not recorded in J employment contract (or elsewhere) as a lability of the
Club or as being payable by the Club. but

b) Was instead recorded in a Consultancy Agreement between [ES EEE
SS

The x thus concealed the true extent of the Club’s liabilities for

93) The monies used to fund the yy — which totalled £8.866million - were
ADUG monies.

    The decision then says that the contractual agreements were a sham but that, if the decision is wrong on that, City was the entity obliged to make the payments under the agreements, and ADUG made them on City’s behalf. The terms should have been included in the individual’s contract with City.

    The name of the individual (and even their gender) is redacted.

    Previous reports have said it was Roberto Mancini (and more on those reports below). We can, however, be reasonably confident it was Mr Mancini without needing to rely on these reports. Take a look at the description in the decision of the rules that were breached:

    120) Additionally in those seasons the Club breached PL Rule Q.7 & 8/P.7 & 8. That was
because (as set out in Appendix 16)

a) The terms of J ought to have been set out in
HE contract with the Club
b) They were not, because no reference was made to the yy.

    PL Rules Q.7/P.7 and Q.8/P.8 relate to manager contracts of employment, so this arrangement definitely related to a manager. There were four managers during the period in question (2009/10 to 2017/18): Pep Guardiola, Mark Hughes, Roberto Mancini and Manuel Pellegrini (plus Brian Kidd, caretaker for the last two games of 2012/13). But the decision says in paragraph 118 that the arrangement related to four seasons. Only one of those managers served for four seasons in this period: Mr Mancini.

    We can double-check by looking at the length of the redacted text. For example, in this paragraph:

    92) The first in time of those devices was the MB. That is addressed in detail
in Appendix 16. In essence a significant part of the remuneration that we find was payable

by the Club to gM in return for the services that Jj was contracted to provide to the

Ch) a

    We measured the black box after “payable by the Club to” as 40.3 points wide. “Mancini” in the same font (12pt Times New Roman) would be 40.0 points wide. The names of the other managers during this period are either too small (“Hughes”, 36.7 points) or too large (“Pellegrini”, 46.7 points, and “Guardiola”, 48.0 points).

    The Commission’s findings are also consistent with the facts and chronology revealed by documents leaked in 2018, which name Mr Mancini throughout.

    The chronology

    The “Football Leaks” revealed a 53-page bundle of documents relating to Mr Mancini. Neither Mr Mancini nor Manchester City has disputed the authenticity of these documents. They are also consistent with the findings in the Commission’s decision, and, critically, the payments listed in the bundle add up to the £8,866,367 figure used in the decision.

    If we discard the possibility that the bundle is forged, we are confident that it is describing the same arrangement that is the subject of the Commission’s decision.

    Here’s the initial chronology revealed from the bundle, most of which was previously reported by Der Spiegel and L’Espresso:

    19 December 2009: Manchester City signs an agreement in principle (a “heads of agreement“) with Mr Mancini giving him a basic salary of £1,450,000 per season on a net basis, after deduction of tax. This kind of “net-of-tax” salary would be extraordinary in most of the business world, but is the norm in football: the club bears the tax.

    Also 19 December 2009: Al Jazira Sports and Cultural Club sends Mr Mancini heads of agreement for a “Consulting Agreement” (pp.5-6). Al Jazira would pay Mr Mancini’s company (unspecified) a fee of £1,750,000 per year for coaching services in Abu Dhabi, for “a minimum of [4] days per Year”. The fees “will be paid without deduction of any taxation”. Al Jazira is, like Manchester City, owned by Sheikh Mansoor.

    March 2010: The consultancy agreement is finalised (see pages 7-17). It’s signed between Al Jazira and Sparkleglow Holdings Ltd, a Mauritian company, for four days each year. The commencement date is 1 January 2010, and the fee is £1.75m a year plus a “Signing On Fee” of £62,328.77.

    It’s hard to explain why Mr Mancini would receive more money from a four day consultancy contract than from his main employer. Harder still to explain the strange signing-on fee. But perhaps because the 1 January commencement date for the consultancy agreement is 13 days after Mr Mancini was appointed as manager at City, and £1,750,000 × 13/365 = £62,328.77?

    Things became clearer when, on 25 March 2011, Sparkleglow asked Al Jazira to pay the first £1,805,136.99.

    SPARKLEGLOW HOLDINGS LTD
St James Court, Suite 308, St Denis Street, Port Louis
Republic of Mauritius

Date: 25 March, 2011

Al Jazira Sports and Cultural Club Limited
P.O. Box 2750
AbuDhabi, United Arab Emirates

Dear Sirs,

I refer to the Consultancy agreement in force between Al Jazira Sports and Cultural Club
Limited and our Company.

Please kindly proceed with the payment of the amount due to our Company to date, i.e. GBP
1,805,136.99, in consideration of the activities performed by Mr Roberto Mancini in
accordance with the. above agreement, on the following bank account:

Account holder Roberto Mancini Sparkleglow
Account number 1295
IBAN es
Bank Banca Popolare di Ancona, filiale di Roma
SWIFT . BLOPIT22
ABI 05308
CAB 03200
Thank you and best regards,
y)
FITCO (DIRECTORS) LTD

Represented by Denis Sek Sum (Mr.)

    This exact amount is paid, but not by Al Jazira:

    View Currency/International Payment/SEPA Credit Transfer

Payment Identification:

Status:
BIB Reference Number:
API Reference Number:
AFTS Control Reference:
Sensitive:
©
“Source:

Beneficiary Source:
Payment Source:

Payment From:

Account Name:
Sort Code:
Account Number:
Currency:

Payment Classification:
Urgency and Type:
Payment To:

Beneficiary Name;
Beneficiary Address;
Beneficlary Country:

Account Number:

IBAN:

Account Currency:
Beneficiary Bank Name:
Beneficiary Bank Address:

Beneficiary Bank Country:
Beneficiary Bank SWIFT Id:
National Clearing Code Type:
National Clearing Code:

Payment Details:

Requested Deblt Currency and Amount:
Sent Currency and Amount:

Actual Sent Amount:

Exchange Rate:

Execution Date:

Requested Value Date:

Available Value Date:

Actual Value Date:

Payment Reference:

down.to. bottom.

Completed
1000080333 ,
BIB-0871909399
019657

Sensitive Payment

Entered manuatly
Entered manually

MCFC STADIUM OPER
205534

GBP
Urgent Currency/International Payment

ROBERTO MANCINI SPARKLEGLOW

UBI BANGA (UNIONE DI BANCHE TTALTAN
BERGAMO

PIAZZA V. VENETO 8 24122 BERGAMO
Italy

BLOPIT22

GBP 1,805,136.99
GBP 1,805,136.99
GBP 1,805,136.99

28/03/2011
28/03/2011
28/03/2011
28/03/2011

    The payment was made from an account with Barclays Bank Manchester called “MCFC Stadium Oper” and authorised by the head of finance at Manchester City:

    NN EEE EIEN

Authorisation:

Equivalent value of payment in sterling: GBP 1,805,136.99
Authorisation: Autherisation(2)
Imported By:
input 8y:
Verifled By:
Authorised By: Mr ANDREW HARDMAN
Mr ANDREW WIDDOWSON

Rlatacs

    Then, when Mr Mancini’s lawyer sought to renegotiate elements of the consultancy contract, she did not write to Al Jazira. She wrote to City’s chief executive, Garry Cook.

    Manchester City, of course, was not a party to the consultancy contract. But Mr Cook nevertheless agrees to make an additional payment to cover Mr Mancini’s Italian tax, and says explicitly that this was all part of Mr Mancini’s overall compensation:

    In addition the amendment made to the consultancy agreement payments carry forward into
2011/12 which has also been agreed and the adjustment to Roberto’s annual compensation will ensure
that the £1.750m will be a net payment. The gross payment to achieve this will move from £1.75m to
£3,.2m and the necessary adjustments will be made immediately.

The 2011/12 Manager contract salary will increase in accordance with a performance bonus
being added to the previous year fixed amount. Therefore 201 1/12 base salary will rise from £2.9m to
£3.4m

The guaranteed compensation total rises from £4.6m to £6.6m which is considered to be
highly competitive within the Premier League.

    The arrangement changed in July 2011 (possibly for Italian tax reasons). The Sparkleglow consultancy agreement was terminated with effect from 31 March 2011 and replaced by a new consultancy agreement between Al Jazira and Italy International Services srl (pages 30-39), a Rome company at the address of Mr Mancini’s lawyers.

    There then seems to have been some attempt to hide what was going on. When payments were made, the Italian company sent invoices to Al Jazira. Then City paid ADUG, ADUG sent the money to Al Jazira, and Al Jazira paid the Italian company.

    This all became routine. Here’s City’s chief operating officer asking the head of finance to arrange the payments.

    From: Graham Wallace

Sent: 08 July 2012 17:47

To: Andrew Widdowson

Cc: |

Subject: Fwd: invoice from Italy Int. Services srl

Andy
Will you please do the usual with this - remit the funds to ADUG and then email Simon

Pearce, copy to J with the invoice and ask him to arrange onward transfer to Al
Jazira so that it may make direct payment to IIS as per prior quarters. Thanks

    So it is not at all surprising that the Commission’s decision says this was a “sham” or, failing that, ADUG acting on behalf of Manchester City:

    116) The agreements underlying the J were a sham: Appendix 20.

117) If we are wrong on that, then the economic substance of such agreements and the yy
HE, «2S 2 «whole differed from the legal form of those agreements, in that the
liability recorded therein was a liability of the Club (1) which was the Club’s obligation to
pay, and (2) which ADUG paid on its behalf: Appendices 16 and 24.

    On the evidence of the leaked documents, this is one of the clearest cases of sham our team has seen.

    Should Manchester City have paid tax on Mr Mancini’s consultancy income?

    Mr Mancini was, we assume, fully taxed on his income under his main contract with Manchester City. The club will have applied PAYE to deduct income tax and employee National Insurance from his wages, and paid employer National Insurance on his gross wages.

    The position for Mr Mancini’s consultancy agreement should have been the same.

    You can’t magically make a salary untaxed by calling it a consultancy fee. If the payments were really for Mr Mancini’s work at Manchester City, they were employment earnings and should have been taxed accordingly.

    The law looks at what a payment is for, not just what the contract calls it. Taxable “earnings” include salary, wages and “anything else that constitutes an emolument of the employment”. That’s deliberately broad. A payment can be employment income even if it comes from someone other than the employer.

    National Insurance is a separate charge. Remuneration derived from employment generally falls within the Class 1 rules, creating both employee and employer liabilities. Again, changing the label or diverting the payment through another party won’t change the result.

    So it doesn’t matter who made the payment under the consultancy agreement, or which person/company received it. It was Mr Mancini’s earnings, and the club should have put it through payroll.

    There should therefore have been UK tax. Manchester City should have applied PAYE and National Insurance to its payments to Mr Mancini under the consultancy agreement in exactly the same way as under his main employment contract.

    This is not an obscure or finely balanced point. On the facts found by the Commission, we would expect the tax treatment to be obvious to any experienced tax adviser, even one who is not a remuneration tax specialist.

    Did Manchester City pay the tax?

    It seems likely that it did not, and the club unlawfully failed to account to HMRC for the PAYE income tax and National Insurance.

    We say that for several reasons.

    First, we can infer it from the absence of any discussion of UK tax in the discussion of the consultancy agreement in the leaked correspondence, which is very focussed on Italian tax. UK tax is mentioned only in the context of Mr Mancini’s “normal” wages from City.

    Second, the correspondence talks about Italian tax being paid by Mr Mancini at 45.1%. There is a double tax treaty between the UK and Italy which means that, where someone is employed by a UK company and carrying on employment in the UK, the UK always has the right to tax their employment income.

    So Manchester City should have been applying UK income tax and National Insurance. It’s possible Mr Mancini also had some Italian tax liability (e.g. if he was resident in Italy for some of the years in question), and in principle he could credit UK tax against that, but UK tax should have been the main consideration. The correspondence shows that it wasn’t even discussed – they were proceeding as if this was a real consultancy between Mr Mancini and Al Jazira when the parties surely knew that it wasn’t. The consequence was that they paid Italian tax but no UK tax.

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    As an aside, the Italian tax was about £1m a year cheaper than the UK tax that should have been paid. Because Mr Mancini’s deal was “net”, this was City’s saving, not Mr Mancini’s.

    We doubt anyone at City ever made this comparison. The original arrangement, with a Mauritian company and fees paid “without any deduction or withholding whatsoever in respect of any taxation“, looks as if it was intended to result in no tax anywhere. Italian tax only appears in the documents in mid-2011, when Mr Mancini’s lawyer asked for “a compensation for the higher taxes to be paid”. So Italian tax was probably a late addition, not a choice.

    Third, if City had accounted for UK tax in the usual way, it would have undone the pretence. PAYE only applies to an employee’s pay. Operating it would have been an admission that the consultancy fees were really Mr Mancini’s salary from City. The payments would then have had to appear in City’s accounts as staff costs, which is exactly what the arrangement was designed to avoid.

    Fourth, we asked Manchester City’s press office if it could confirm that PAYE and National Insurance were correctly paid:

    Dan Neidle ©
Request for comment - tax and the payments to Mancini
To: | i

Dear Sirs and Madams,

| am a tax lawyer and investigative journalist, and the founder of think tank Tax
Policy Associates.

We are investigating the UK tax treatment of the payments made to Roberto
Mancini under his Al Jazira consultancy agreement.

Could you please confirm whether Manchester City, or any company in its group,
accounted to HMRC for PAYE and employer’s National Insurance in respect of
those payments?

If not, has the club subsequently disclosed the payments to HMRC, or has
HMRC opened any enquiry or investigation into their UK tax treatment?

Please respond by 12 pm tomorrow.
Yours faithfully,

Dan Neidle

    This should be a very easy question. We didn’t receive a reply.

    We sent a follow-up…

    Dan Neidle ©
Re: Request for comment - tax and the payments to Mancini
To: bie SPP othe it. It

You have not responded.

If | don't receive a response by 10am tomorrow | will write that | asked you if
tax was properly paid on the payments to Mancini and you did not answer. | will
say that our view is that PAYE and NI should have been applied. | will say that,
if it wasn't, then criminal offences may have been committed.

Dan Neidle

    … and again received no reply.

    In our experience it is highly unusual for someone to not comment, or even respond, when we inform them we are reporting on whether they committed a criminal offence.

    The consequences

    When Der Spiegel published in November 2018, HMRC said it would be “relentless in pursuing” any club that had tried to avoid tax and that it was visiting every Premier League club, while declining to comment on identifiable taxpayers. Nothing has been reported since. We reviewed Manchester City’s accounts from 2018 to 2024/25, and none contain a quantified provision for tax on Mr Mancini’s contract, and the forensic accountants we work with haven’t been able to identify any sign of such a payment.

    We would be surprised if HMRC hadn’t opened an enquiry at some point after 2018; it will have been well in time to do that.

    That enquiry could have been resolved in Manchester City’s favour (although that seems unlikely on the facts available to us). It could have ended with Manchester City paying the tax, but we see no sign of that in the club’s accounts.

    So it is possible that the enquiry is ongoing, and eight years is not an unusual timeframe for a complex enquiry.

    If the tax wasn’t paid at the time and it still hasn’t been paid today, but HMRC opened an enquiry within the time limits, then this is our estimate of the total amount that is due. It works out as considerably more than the figure would have been if City had simply complied with the law at the time – that’s an effect of paying people a “net of tax” amount:

    Tax on £8.87m paid to Mr ManciniIncome tax and NIC£11.6mInterest to date£7.0mPenalty at 35% to 50%£4.1m to £5.8mTotal£23m to £24m

    One might think this is an unfair result because the club has already paid the Italian tax, and now UK tax is being paid too. The flippant answer is that you should expect unfair results when you play these sorts of games. The technical answer is that if the position had been rectified earlier, then Mr Mancini could, in principle, have recovered some of the Italian tax, but it is now too late.

    In principle, Mr Mancini himself would be liable, but in most cases HMRC looks to recover the tax from the employer.

    Was this tax evasion?

    Unpaid tax and tax evasion are not the same thing.

    Tax evasion involves a deliberate and dishonest attempt to evade tax, not merely an error or an unsuccessful legal argument. It’s most commonly prosecuted as the common-law offence of cheating the public revenue, but there are specific statutory offences as well.

    Let’s assume, as seems likely, that Manchester City should have applied PAYE and National Insurance to Mr Mancini’s consultancy payments, but didn’t. Why didn’t it? And does this rise to the level of a criminal offence?

    The crucial legal question to determine whether a tax evasion offence was committed is whether the relevant personnel at City were “dishonest”. Under English law, this means asking whether their conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people (regardless of whether the individuals themselves believed at the time that they were being dishonest).

    The usual defence people raise to a tax evasion prosecution is that they made a mistake, or they honestly thought what they were doing was correct.

    The failure to deduct any UK tax from the consultancy agreement payments doesn’t look like a simple mistake; it seems to have been anticipated from the start. After all, the agreement said the fees “will be paid without deduction of any taxation”. But the relevant City personnel might say that they believed the Al Jazira consultancy was a real and separate arrangement, genuinely referable to activity in Abu Dhabi, so that no UK tax was due. Yes, they got the tax wrong, and City owes the tax, interest and penalties, but they acted in good faith.

    A defence like that is, however, hard to square with the leaked documents. City’s chief executive described the consultancy fee as part of Mr Mancini’s “guaranteed compensation”. City’s head of finance authorised the first payments out of City’s own bank account. After that, City’s finance team routinely sent the money to ADUG, for ADUG to send to Al Jazira, for Al Jazira to pay Mr Mancini’s company. And the Commission has found that the agreements were a sham (albeit to the civil and not criminal standard; and the Commission was not a jury).

    Alternatively, they could accept that the consultancy agreement was a sham, designed to fool the Premier League, but say they had no idea that tax was due. Here it would be relevant to ask whether they obtained outside advice. If they did, and they followed that advice, then any prosecution would be challenging. If there was no tax advice on an arrangement this unusual then that raises its own questions.

    Ultimately, whether to believe such a defence, and whether to find that the individuals were dishonest, would be for a jury to decide in light of all the facts: the tax reporting, the underlying communications and other evidence of the relevant individuals’ knowledge and intentions.

    We should add that we are not suggesting that any specific individuals at Manchester City, or indeed Mr Mancini, committed an offence. We do not know. We are saying that there appear to be good grounds for a criminal investigation of the circumstances under which a sham arrangement was put in place and tax was not paid when it should have been.

    Are there other criminal offences?

    This report focuses on Mr Mancini’s consultancy arrangement, but the facts set out in the decision suggest that the police should be looking at whether non-tax offences were committed.

    False accounting

    Section 17 of the Theft Act 1968 makes it an offence dishonestly to falsify accounting documents, with a view to gain for oneself or another, or an intention to cause loss to another.

    The Commission found the accounts materially misstated income and expenses: paragraph 101. It found intentional concealment (paragraph 109) and that City knew the accounts did not give a true and fair view, or alternatively was reckless about that (paragraph 114).

    Again, the crucial legal question to determine whether an offence was committed is whether the relevant personnel at City were “dishonest” (see the discussion above).

    However, there is an additional challenge for a false accounting prosecution: did Manchester City’s personnel act with a “view to gain”? Manchester City may have ultimately been looking to make a gain from its cheating, but in the short term, its actions lost money rather than made it.

    Approving accounts which do not comply with the law

    Section 393 of the Companies Act 2006 requires directors to be satisfied that accounts give a true and fair view before approving them. Under section 414(4), a director can commit an offence where non-compliant accounts are approved, the director knew of or was reckless about the non-compliance, and failed to take reasonable steps to secure compliance or prevent approval.

    There’s also a specific company law offence that could apply: the accounts were then filed with Companies House, and it’s an offence to knowingly or recklessly deliver materially misleading, false or deceptive documents to Companies House.

    The Commission found that nine seasons’ financial statements failed to give a true and fair view (paragraph 101) and that this was intentional (paragraph 114). That was, of course, to the civil rather than criminal standard, but on the face of it, there seems a strong case that a prosecution should be considered.

    Misleading the auditors

    Under section 501(1) of the Companies Act, knowingly or recklessly giving an auditor a materially misleading, false or deceptive statement can be an offence where it concerns information or explanations the auditor required, or was entitled to require.

    The Commission says that even City’s auditors remained unaware of the disguised funding scheme (see footnote 7 to paragraph 68). It also describes documents generated to conceal the true arrangements from regulators and auditors (see paragraph 78).

    Again, there seems a strong case for a criminal investigation here, subject again to the point that the decision was to the civil and not the criminal standard.

    We are, once more, not saying that any particular individuals committed an offence. We do not know. We are saying there appear to be strong grounds for a criminal investigation.

    Many thanks to M, K and P for their remuneration tax analysis, A, S and O for additional comments, and thanks to L for criminal law advice.

    Thanks most of all to Der Spiegel and L’Espresso for their original 2018 reporting.

    Disclosure: Manchester City is being represented by law firm Clifford Chance LLP. Our founder, Dan Neidle, was a senior partner at Clifford Chance until 2022. When he was a partner, he had no involvement in or knowledge of the case, and has at no time spoken to anyone at the firm regarding it.

    Photo by Mylo Kaye on Unsplash.

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